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ABSTRACT 
 
This article illustrates how Gilgit-Baltistan in northern Pakistan—bordering Afghanistan, 
China, and India—has been part of an “assemblage of marginality” since the region was 
incorporated in 1947 and 1948. We situate our case amidst recent scholarship that seeks to go 
beyond mere location at the territorial limits of the nation-state as the defining feature of a 
border area. In addition, we emphasize the temporal aspects of how marginality in Gilgit-
Baltistan has been assembled through four constituent processes: (1) the continuity of the 
colonial legacy in the western Himalaya, poignantly highlighted by the ongoing dispute 
between India and Pakistan that has resulted in Gilgit-Baltistan’s constitutionally ambiguous 
status today; (2) the pervasiveness of nationalist histories and cultural tropes about Gilgit-
Baltistan that have been constructed for the post-colonial state; (3) a local political economy 
subservient to a centralist agenda that has been amplified by the introduction of the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); (4) the formation of local identities in Gilgit-Baltistan, 
marked by exclusion from the state, which offers insights into marginality as identity. In sum, 
we argue that this assemblage of marginality goes far beyond Gilgit-Baltistan and provides 
ample points of comparison with marginal spaces in other locations around the globe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the study of borders and boundaries has gone through a number of 
shifts that have resulted in a readjustment of the research foci that now define the field. For 
instance, Wilson and Donnan (2012, p. 13) argue that there has been an overall turn away 
from an emphasis on nation, state, and periphery to culture, ethnography, process, social 
practice, and reverse margin–center relations. Recent scholarship has also explored borders as 
“epistemic angle” and “method” (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Sidaway, 2015, p. 217), and an 
abundance of historical and contemporary case studies have highlighted the complex 
relationship between the state, territory as a political technology, and everyday lives at the 
border (see, e.g., Gellner, 2013; Harris, 2013; Megoran, 2017; Newman, 1999; Paasi, 1996; 
Reeves, 2014; Rumford, 2012; Saxer & Zhang, 2017; Shneiderman, 2013; Van Schendel, 
2003). Contributing to this literature, in their introduction to a special issue on borders in 
South Asia in this journal, Cons and Sanyal (2013) emphasize the potential of bringing border 
studies into conversation with the concept of marginality. They argue that calling borderlands 
“margins” has become “academic common sense” (6), but also note that the larger body of 
literature on marginality—especially studies deriving from research on South Asia—remains 
underexplored. In this respect, Cons and Sanyal (2013, p. 9) make the crucial point that the 
lens of marginality might free border studies from an inherent spatialization at the fringes of 
the nation-state by opening up a comparative perspective on a range of different locales. Such 
“articulations across space,” they argue, might also fruitfully engage with and remedy 
tendencies of equating margins with “non-elite” in the literature on marginality. Cons and 
Sanyal’s argument in favor of space as a means to overcome the shortage of research 
comparing borderlands and other margins is timely, and in this article we seek to take this 
angle to Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan’s northern administrative region on the border with 
Afghanistan, China, and India. However, we also attempt to add to Cons and Sanyal’s focus 
on spatialization by emphasizing the temporal aspects of marginality—the history of 
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assembling the margins that provides points of comparison and distinction vis-à-vis other 
“marginal spaces” in borderlands and elsewhere. Following DeLanda (2016, p. 2), we 
perceive this assemblage of marginality as consisting of “parts” that “are not uniform either in 
nature or origin” but that are nevertheless “fitted together.” These different parts—in the case 
of Gilgit-Baltistan, the legacy of colonial rule, nationalist histories constructed for the post-
colonial state, a local political economy subservient to a statist agenda, and marginality as 
identity—stand in shifting relationships to each other. We describe the nature of these 
relationships as a “symbiosis” (Deleuze & Parnet 1977, p. 69) that co-functions with other 
assemblages of marginality far beyond Gilgit-Baltistan.   
 Our analysis of the process of assembling marginality in Gilgit-Baltistan is informed 
by three strains in political geography: the border at the territorial limits of the state; the 
border as part of a frontier and a zone of overlapping influence; and the border as a line that 
both divides and yet accommodates connections—personal, material, or emotive—across 
sovereign states (this last strain is characteristic of studies that focus on South Asia).  
First, border areas’ geographical location on the fringes of the nation-state has 
remained a principal element in constituting borderlands, and propinquity continues to inform 
borderland scholarship. Studies have highlighted local agency and the borderland 
populations’ strategic and resourceful positioning (e.g., Baud & Van Schendel, 1997; Gellner, 
2013; Giersch, 2006; Harris, 2013; Murton, 2017; Reeves, 2014; Saxer, 2016), as well as the 
transformative impact of national, geopolitical, and material forces at nation-state boundaries 
(Baghel & Nüsser, 2015; Fravel, 2008; Goldstein, 2006; Karrar, 2010; Steinberg & 
Kristoffersen, 2017). In his recent critique of this spatial fix, Jinba (2017) even goes so far as 
to compare the Sino–Tibetan borderlands with the city of Hong Kong—both a “center” and a 
borderland on the territorial fringes of China.  
Second, while states may frequently project borders as demarcating sovereignty, 
borders have also been seen as part of the frontier and as zones of overlapping influence. For 
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instance, in his Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Lattimore approached frontiers as overlapping 
zones of power, seeing variations in the Great Wall of China as evidence of ever-shifting 
political and military power at the margins of the state (1962[1940], p. 238). Pratt’s Imperial 
Eyes describes frontiers as “contact zones” that “shift the center of gravity” and invoke “the 
space and time where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-present, 
the point at which their trajectories now intersect” (2008[1992], p. 8). In Fragments of the 
Afghan Frontier, Marsden and Hopkins (2011, pp. 2–3) frame the frontier as a place of 
“complex dynamism” that is “continually occupied, defined and redefined by the people, 
communities and political entities that claim it as their own.” Finally, in a recent article, Jones 
et al. similarly argue that “border barriers, corridors and transit camps become elements … in 
a structuring of space that reconfigures … geopolitics” (2017, p. 3), indicating how flows 
across borders influence national and regional polities. Certainly, in particular contexts—the 
influx of refugees, for example, or goods moving outside of state regulations, or the 
fluctuation of Arctic sea-ice edges—the border can be conceptualized as a shifting line of 
sovereignty (Mountz, 2011; Steinberg & Kristoffersen, 2017). 
Third, reference to South Asian borders inevitably raises the specter of conflict 
between the nuclear rivals India and Pakistan. We would be remiss not to mention here that 
Gilgit-Baltistan—an administrative unit within Pakistan that has a constitutionally ambiguous 
status—was born out of the Kashmir conflict. This conflict, now in its seventieth year, 
underscores the lasting trauma of division in South Asia not only in 1947, but also in 1971 
(Saikia, 2011; Zamindar, 2010). At the same time, an exclusive emphasis on states of conflict 
runs the risk of overlooking how South Asian border regimes have steadily transformed ideas 
of sovereignty, citizenship, trajectories of material exchanges and, more broadly, daily life 
itself (Harris, 2013; Shneiderman, 2013). In this regard, memory allows affective connections 
within South Asia (as well as other parts of Asia) to traverse internal boundaries such as 
ethnic and sectarian divisions (Mostowlansky, 2018 and forthcoming; Smith, 2013).  
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These three strands—the border at the edge, the border as a zone of overlapping 
influence, and (South Asian) borders that are projected as impassable yet are permeable in a 
multitude of ways—are fundamental to how we approach Gilgit-Baltistan. Beyond being a 
contact zone with place-specific characteristics, Gilgit-Baltistan’s classification as a border 
area is not, we argue, a priori spatially fixed. Being located at the territorial limits of the 
nation-state is neither Gilgit-Baltistan’s primary marker nor the only reason why it is often 
described as a “border area”—an expression that has entered the Urdu language and replaced 
its vernacular counterparts in all but the most formal usage. Instead, we situate Gilgit-
Baltistan’s border area classification in a historically continuous process of assembling 
cultural, economic, political, and spatial marginality, marked by exclusion through the 
erection of internal boundaries and “networks of marginalization, dislocation, subaltern 
theorization, and contested history” (Cons & Sanyal, 2013, p. 6). Disaggregating the meaning 
of Gilgit-Baltistan’s border area classification, our approach has applicability to any such 
term (for example, “borderlands,” “frontiers,” “margins”) that captures assemblages of 
marginality.  
Thus, we offer an alternative approach to conceptualizing border areas in which the 
situatedness of such locales on the fringes of the nation-state is not the only determining 
variable. We draw on literature focusing on sites in Greece, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Tajikstan that frames marginality as an outcome of the interplay of multipolar forces that 
work toward constituting center and periphery (Anwar, 2016; Das & Poole, 2004; Green, 
2005; Mostowlansky, 2017 and forthcoming; Tsing, 1993 and 1994; Williams, Vira & 
Chopra, 2011). Thus, if a border area is a marginal space—and if marginality can be argued to 
be constituted through polity, whether national, regional, or local—then a border area can be 
disengaged from the territorial limits of the state. By foregrounding the process of assembling 
marginality, our disaggregation of Gilgit-Baltistan’s border area status offers a framework for 
doing just that. 
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In this article, we—a Pakistani (Karrar) and a Swiss (Mostowlansky) academic—build 
on ethnographic and historical data from Gilgit-Baltistan. Karrar has been visiting the region 
for more than two decades; his ongoing research, which he has been developing since 2012, 
explores how cross-border connections with China impact local polities. Mostowlansky has 
conducted regular ethnographic and archival research in and on Gilgit-Baltistan since 2012. In 
the following, we will draw on field notes based on extensive participant observation, several 
dozen interviews conducted in the framework of long-term fieldwork (Karrar: 5 months from 
2012 to 2017; Mostowlansky: 8 months from 2013 to 2016), and written sources and 
literature gathered in northern Pakistan during separate periods of research as well as during a 
month of joint fieldwork that we conducted while teaching a field course on the history and 
ecology of Gilgit-Baltistan in June 2016.     
In the following, we analyze the historical and contemporary process of assembling 
marginality in Gilgit-Baltistan in four parts. In the first part, we explore the legacy of colonial 
rule in the region, offering an overview of its place within the larger schema of projecting 
colonial power along the Himalaya, and how, in the seventy years since independence, Gilgit-
Baltistan has had to contend with a constitutionally ambiguous status as a result of Pakistan’s 
geopolitical ambitions over greater Kashmir. In the second part, we discuss Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
integration into Pakistan’s cultural imagination, a process that has fostered marginality and 
actualized internal boundaries. In the third part, we analyze the amplification of marginality 
through local political economy subservient to the center. In this regard, we describe how the 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor linking the two namesake countries mandates increased 
securitization and enforces marginality at different levels. Finally, in the fourth part, we show 
that marginality is not simply an imposition by the state, but is a component of local identity 
that people engage with, internalize, or reject. This process is framed by how people see 
themselves in the state, or what Sharp, referring to the pioneering work of hooks (1990), has 
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deftly described as “political identities … established through geographical representations 
that are neither fully ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’” (2013, p. 22).   
 
LEGACIES OF COLONIAL RULE  
Gilgit-Baltistan is Pakistan’s northernmost administrative region. The Karakoram and the 
western terminus of the Himalaya extend across this high mountain region, making it the most 
heavily glaciated region outside of the polar areas. Gilgit-Baltistan shares international 
boundaries with Afghanistan (along the Wakhan corridor in Badakshan province), India 
(along Jammu and Kashmir), and the People’s Republic of China (in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region). The 1,300-km-long Karakoram Highway, completed in 1976, links the 
region to down-country Pakistan and northwards to China. The majority of Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
two million residents live in towns and villages along this vital transport artery or directly 
accessible from it. 
Despite its strategic importance, Gilgit-Baltistan does not have provincial status. The 
lack of provincial status restricts the region’s representation within the national polity: there is 
no mention of Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan’s constitution, no representation in the national 
legislature, and citizens have no access to the country’s highest courts. Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
status—which scholars have described as “legal and constitutional liminality” (Butz & Cook, 
2016, pp. 200–201; Hong, 2013, esp. pp. 73–89)—sets the tenor for a difficult relationship 
between the region and the national polity. “Seventy years of wanting to be part of Pakistan, 
and nothing,” Rahim, a trader from Nagar, told Karrar in an interview in June 2017.1 “We 
must be the only people in the world who want to be part of a state that the state won’t let in,” 
he added wryly. As connectivity with China increases, the benefits of which are purportedly 
                                                                                                                
1 To protect our interlocutors we use pseudonyms throughout the article. 
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enjoyed by down-country Pakistan, local resentment at exclusion has amplified. We shall 
return to this idea in the penultimate section. 
While Gilgit-Baltistan’s current constitutional liminality results from Pakistan’s 
dispute with India over Kashmir, historically, the region’s political marginality predates the 
1947 division of the subcontinent. Britain, an expansionist colonial power, grew interested in 
the region after Central Asia entered into the empire’s strategic calculations at the end of the 
eighteenth century (Withers, 2013). British anxieties about—and policies toward—its 
northern colonial frontiers continued to evolve throughout the nineteenth century. Although 
they had awarded Jammu and Kashmir to the Dogra following the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar, 
within a quarter-century the British opted for a more assertive strategy. Truncating Dogra rule 
over Gilgit—but not neighboring Baltistan, seen as less strategic—in 1871 the British 
established the Gilgit Agency, which was overseen by a British political agent. In 1891, the 
princely states of Hunza and Nagar were brought under colonial rule, severing the former’s 
tributary status with China’s Qing dynasty. Crucially, Britain employed a strategy of indirect 
rule, with a political agent reporting to colonial authorities in Srinagar (Haines, 2004; 
Huttenback, 1975; Kreutzmann, 1998; Sökefeld, 2005). 
Two weeks before the division of the subcontinent in mid-August 1947, the Gilgit 
Agency was returned to the Dogra rulers. Today’s Gilgit-Baltistan became part of the princely 
state of Jammu and Kashmir, the maharaja of which had opted to join India. Gilgit-Baltistan 
joined Pakistan through local secession: Gilgit seceded from India and joined Pakistan in 
November 1947, and Baltistan the following spring. Even though it exercised control over a 
large swath of the Himalaya, Pakistan was—and has, since 1948, remained—fixated on 
Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control. In Pakistan’s geopolitical schema, not granting 
provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan is a strategic decision. Pakistan claims that Gilgit-
Baltistan was historically part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, Pakistan has 
remained steadfast in its insistence that Gilgit-Baltistan not acquire provincial status until the 
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Kashmir dispute is settled as per United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 of 27 April 
1948, which calls for a “free and impartial plebiscite” across all of historical Jammu and 
Kashmir to ascertain the will of the people (such a plebiscite would cover Gilgit-Baltistan, the 
semi-autonomous Azad Kashmir [also in Pakistan], and [Indian] Jammu and Kashmir). 
Providing provincial status for Gilgit-Baltistan in the meantime would undermine Pakistan’s 
ambitions of an undivided Kashmir within Pakistan,2 and be a de facto admission that current 
international boundaries are acceptable (Bangash, 2010).  
Since 1947, there have been two significant attempts at administrative restructuring. 
The first was in 1974 when, during the government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
(1973–1977), the Gilgit Agency, Baltistan, and the princely states Hunza and Nagar were 
classified as one administrative unit, the Northern Areas (it was at this time that princely 
states were abolished, bringing the entire region under federal rule). The next major 
restructuring occurred in 2009 when, during the tenure of President Asif Ali Zardari (2008–
2013), the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order was passed (as a result 
of which the Northern Areas were renamed “Gilgit-Baltistan”). The 2009 ordinance appeared 
to be a landmark decision: it gave more autonomy to the region through a legislative assembly 
and appointments of a chief minister (provincial premier) and a governor. But the legislation 
stopped short of providing provincial status. Instead, a Gilgit-Baltistan Council was set up 
under Article 33 of the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order. The 
Gilgit-Baltistan Council is headed by the prime minister of Pakistan, while the governor of 
                                                                                                                
2 Pakistan has continuously emphasized that all of Jammu and Kashmir should  have been part of Pakistan at 
independence. There is also a multitude of stakeholders in the Kashmir dispute, not least politicians in (Pakistan-
administered) Jammu and Kashmir—a fragment of historic Jammu and Kashmir presently governed from within 
Pakistan with its own legislative assembly—whose political leadership has remained steadfast that Gilgit-
Baltistan should not be given provincial status, as doing so would undermine the struggle for a unified Kashmir 
(Mahmud 2016). 
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the region—a state appointee—serves as the vice-chair. The position of chief minister, who 
heads the local assembly, is popularly regarded in Gilgit-Baltistan as ceremonial.  
Hence, Gilgit-Baltistan’s historical legacy engenders political marginality. 
Fundamentally, Pakistan’s ambitions vis-à-vis Kashmir led to a constitutionally enshrined 
liminal status within the national polity. This is more than a legal impasse; it falls short of 
local aspirations for political representation at the national level. Residents of Gilgit-Baltistan 
are frustrated at how the state considers it an appendage of a greater Jammu and Kashmir. 
Many people from Gilgit-Baltistan consider themselves inalienable Pakistani citizens—recall 
Rahim who voiced widespread frustration at the lack of provincial status—who are 
nevertheless denied equal citizenship because of geopolitical positioning by the state 
(Sökefeld, 2015, p. 251). While Gilgit-Baltistan has been the recipient of focused state-led 
development projects since the 1970s, not to mention extensive non-state funding through 
non-governmental organizations (Kreutzmann, 2012, pp. 231–233)—local grievances in 
Gilgit-Baltistan are amplified because of the lack of representation.  
Beyond geopolitics, the post-colonial state was slow to shed remnants of colonial 
administration. Consider how, in 1948, Pakistan’s first governor-general (and leader of the 
Pakistan movement), Mohammed Ali Jinnah, extended the colonial Frontiers Crime 
Regulation (FCR) to the region. The FCR was drafted in 1901 during the viceroyalty of Lord 
Curzon (1898–1905). It attempted to bring codified law to the so-called tribal areas of the 
British Indian Empire through political agents who represented the colonial state and were 
empowered to exert legal jurisdiction (Shaw & Akhtar, 2012, p. 1498). The FCR—and 
indeed, the political agent, as representative of the state—remained in Gilgit-Baltistan until 
the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Government legislation was enacted. What 
this illustrates, among other things, is that Pakistan was slow to transcend its colonial 
relationship with the region. Long after colonialism, Gilgit-Baltistan remained the veritable 
contact zone, a colonial frontier with a high degree of insecurity in the valleys and danger 
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beyond the mountains. And as we describe in the next section, the frontier is essentialized not 
just by the state, but in another way: through a nationalist imaginary—reinforced in popular 
culture—in which the frontier plays a pivotal role. 
 
THE NATION GAZES AT THE FRONTIER  
The newly independent states of Asia, including China, India, and Pakistan, saw heavy 
investment in infrastructure that brought once distant regions more tightly under the control of 
post-colonial centralizing regimes (see, e.g., Bergmann, 2016; Cliff, 2016; Ispahani, 1989). In 
the case of Pakistan, where the colonial state had often been content to leave border regions as 
autonomous or self-governing entities, the post-colonial state sought closer control over these 
regions as an extension of sovereignty. At the same time, however, the post-colonial state 
appropriated and perpetuated the colonial gaze: Pakistan’s frontiers remained the proverbial 
others, distant yet paradoxically central to national identity. 
In a different historical and political context, the role of the frontier in the creation of 
national identity had been a central tenet in Frederick Jackson Turner’s well-known address to 
the American Historical Association in 1892. Turner’s thesis has been justifiably criticized for 
its lack of treatment of ethnic minorities and women (Cronon, 1987, pp. 158–159); 
nevertheless, in the popular imagination, the westward expansion of the American frontier 
continues to resonate powerfully as a nation-building endeavor. As Cronon (1987, p. 160) 
stated matter-of-factly: “[W]e have not yet figured out a way to escape [Turner] ... Why is it 
that the ‘vanishing frontier’ refuses to vanish?” This rhetorical question underscores the 
pervasiveness of the idea; Cronon notes that its popularity is rooted in scholarly inertia, the 
entrenchment of a lexicon about “frontiers” (which assumes that the word has an inherent 
meaning without precisely defining it) and, crucially, “longings many Americans still feel 
about their national experience” (ibid).  
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We invoke Turner not because we agree with his thesis—as Cumings (2009, p. 35) 
notes, Turner did not so much “investigate the frontier” as “invent it and exalt it”—but 
because Gilgit-Baltistan’s border area status plays a similar role in Pakistan. In the previous 
section, we approached the assembling of marginality from the vantage of the state and its 
prioritizing of a nationalist history for a geopolitical agenda. In this section, we consider 
marginality from another aspect of polity: the cultural and social imaginary through which 
Gilgit-Baltistan is perceived as a frontier zone that (1) experienced Islam’s unifying influence 
and (2) exhibits measured diversity essential to the imagination of the nation. 
In the national imaginary, Muslim identity binds northern Pakistan to the rest of the 
country (Hussain, 2015, p. 109). This approach to religion and polity is grounded neither in 
anthropology nor in history. Instead, Islam is invoked to rationalize and consolidate the 
Pakistani nation. It is assigned the pivotal role in state formation and is even considered 
Pakistan’s raison d’être. In national narratives, Pakistan was created for the Muslims of South 
Asia, and Islam—literalist and strictly doctrinal—defines Muslim identity.3  
Closer to our region of inquiry, Pakistan’s most well-known historian of Gilgit-
Baltistan, the late Ahmad Hasan Dani, also saw Islam as playing a unifying role. In his 
magnum opus, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, Dani’s discussion of regional pre-
Islamic history (which he labels “Medieval History”) acknowledges the role of diverse 
influences from across Asia in the shaping of Gilgit-Baltistan (1989a, ch. 6). Yet in Dani’s 
                                                                                                                
3 For instance, in an introduction to an anthology of documents tracing the foundations of Pakistan (to 1906, the 
year the Muslim League was founded), editor Sharifuddin Pirzada (1969, pp. ix–xi), who served as foreign 
minister (1966–1968) and twice as attorney general (1968–1971; 1977–1984), chooses to begin the narrative 
concerning the creation of Pakistan with South Asia’s Islamic background. His teleological narrative begins in 
the eighth century, breathlessly arriving at the demise of the Mughal empire in barely two pages without 
interrogating the relationship between religion and the geographical extent of the polity.  
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telling of the story, these external influences become less important as Islam spread across the 
region. The advent of Islam, according to Dani, had a binding role, with “the struggle for 
freedom by the people of [the] Northern Areas” being “not only directed against foreign 
aggressors [the British] but it was also connected with maintaining cultural identity with 
Islam since the time Islam became the formal religion and culture of the people as a whole” 
(p. 249).  
Here we see the coming together of a singular anti-colonial freedom struggle, a 
singular people, and a singular cultural identity that is closely associated with a singular 
definition of Islam. For a region fraught with polarizing sectarian divisions between Sunni 
and Shi’a Islam (and indeed, further divisions within Shi’a Islam in the form of Ismaili and 
Twelver Shi’a sub-sects), Dani’s treatment of Islam in Gilgit-Baltistan serves a narrative of 
national cohesion. The dedication of the book itself—“To the Freedom Fighters of Gilgit and 
Skardu”—also privileges a unitary national imaginary in which historical actors converged on 
the creation of a cohesive nation-state. There is also a civilizational dimension, with Pakistan 
projected as a space that had an intrinsic geographical coherence which carried forward into 
the present. The present polity, we are told, occupies the geographical stretch of the Indus 
Valley (Dani, 1989b, pp. 27–28). This spatial imaginary, which assumes the presence of a 
distinct “civilization” along the river Indus dating back to the late Neolithic and Bronze age 
settlements from Mehrgarh to Harappa (c. 7000–1300 BCE), also uncritically subsumes 
Gilgit-Baltistan into national narratives. A similar idea has recently been described by one 
Pakistani author as “unity in diversity” (Ghaffar ,2005; Dani wrote the foreword). Despite the 
acknowledgement of cultural variations, this view is ultimately grounded in a nationalist 
ethos, as evidenced by the operative word unity.  
The national discourse, however, stops short of claiming absolute homogeneity: given 
the geographical variation within the country, room is allowed for tempered diversity. Within 
the straightjacket of the nation, variations in religious identity and topography are tactfully 
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used to project Pakistan as more than a strictly homogeneous state and people. For example, a 
popular promotional poster for tourism depicts dancing Kalash women of Chitral as a token 
other for a purportedly multi-religious state, when in fact the people of Chitral are 
increasingly under pressure to convert to Islam. In other official posters and images of 
northern Pakistan, mountains and glaciers are meant to signify divine bounty. The frontier—
when imagined in this way—has a role to play in constructing Pakistan as a diverse and 
bountiful nation. As an illustration, consider the cover of Quddus’s (1990) The North-West 
Frontier of Pakistan, a book that not only covers the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province 
(formerly known as North-West Frontier Province), but also includes Gilgit-Baltistan. The 
cover features a painting of a bearded, turbaned, blue-eyed Pashtun—the book is purportedly 
about Pashtun—with a Kalashnikov and cartridge belt slung over his shoulder. On the back 
cover, a Kalash women in ceremonial dress peers intently at the reader, while to the side a 
mustachioed man with deep-set eyes does a sword dance. In the distance are snowcapped 
mountains, which recede into barren hills as dusk settles over the horizon. From this vantage 
point the frontier is discursive, and place-specific characteristics merge into one or vanish 
entirely. 
 These illustrations of an untamed and exotic frontier are important to the national 
imagination, but this is still a colonial imaginary. Consider this description from the book: 
“[Pashtuns] are men of swords and guns … the life of tribal Pukhtoons is governed by 
Pakhtoonwali … This code of honour contains values of life and embraces all the activities 
from the cradle to the grave. Hospitality, truce, vengeance…” (Quddus, 1990, p. 137). The 
Kalash: “The weapons of the Kafirs4 are the dagger, bow and arrow, spear and matchlock … 
Shields are all important. A few swords are received as gifts from Muslim friends” (p. 236). 
And here is a description of the Karakoram—located in Gilgit-Baltistan—from the epilogue: 
                                                                                                                
4 In popular usage, Kafir is a pejorative term to denote a non-Muslim.  
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“This study unfolds what is most alluring in this admirable country … No wonder that the 
metaphorical name of the Karakoram range is roof of the world. High above the snowline, 
somewhere amidst a sea of peaks and glaciers, which wall the northern areas of Pakistan, 
amidst the voiceless waste of a vast wilderness, 20,000 feet and more above the sea, 
absolutely inaccessible to man … and no living creature except the Pamir eagle, lie the 
frontiers of Pakistan, China, Soviet Russia, Afghanistan and India” (p. 321).  
The first two of these descriptions (of the Pashtun and the Kalash)—from an eminent 
civil servant and self-styled historian—present an orientalized depiction of the frontier and its 
people, not dissimilar to how the colonial state constructed frontier people and, indeed, 
periodically continues to do so through nostalgia for the Raj and the nineteenth-century 
Anglo–Afghan wars (Lindholm, 1980). But it is the third of these excerpts that poignantly 
illustrates the role of frontier regions within the post-colonial state: there is an 
acknowledgement of statehood (“this admirable country”), a nod to geographical enclosure 
(“which wall the northern areas of Pakistan”) juxtaposed against a constructed—and 
hyperbolic—expression of an ambiguous sovereignty (“somewhere amidst,” “vast 
wilderness,” “absolutely inaccessible,” “no living creature”). Quddus’s book—like Dani’s, 
which was published a year earlier—is dedicated to those who safeguard sovereignty on the 
frontier, “the Guardians of the North-West Frontier of Pakistan on whose vigilance 
international peace in the region [sic].” Published immediately following the Soviet retreat 
from Afghanistan, it is hard not to wonder if the “Guardians of the North-West Frontier” is a 
reference to the mujahidin. 
The historical administrative challenges that resulted from poor infrastructure and lack 
of communication are slowly being erased. Popular narratives, as we noted, have successively 
subsumed Gilgit-Baltistan into a nationalist construct. However, many Pakistanis still view 
the region through the rubric of exceptionalism and exoticism, thus reinforcing Gilgit-
Baltistan as a “border area.” Popularly, Gilgit-Baltistan is often conflated with Khyber-
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Pakhtunkhwa, the former North-West Frontier. People we have spoken to in the region over 
the past five years—whether self-employed in the tourism industry, farmers, public-sector 
employees, or traders—complain that domestic tourists frequently assume that they are 
Pashtun and address them as “Khan,” a common Pashtun surname. At the same time, in the 
Hunza valley, whose population is predominantly Shia Ismaili Muslim, many people told us 
that down-country Pakistani visitors enter homes and take pictures of locals that they deem 
exotic and non-Muslim. The dramatic growth in domestic tourism since 2015 has exacerbated 
this problem, as the spatial demarcations between the tourist and non-tourist parts of 
Karimabad, the major tourist hub in Hunza, become blurred. Against the backdrop of these 
continuously emerging patterns of contact between people in Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of 
Pakistan, which are marked by relations of power and frontier orientalism (Hussain, 2015; 
Mostowlansky, 2014; Sökefeld, 2005), the state, too, continues to gaze upon the region 
through a colonial lens, at some level a contested space that speaks to state anxieties about the 
extent of its control. As we describe in the following section, it is precisely Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
closer economic and material integration into the country through infrastructure development 
and capital mobility that has transformed and signposted marginality from political discourse 
and frontier orientalism to the realities of everyday life.  
 
CORRIDORS, BYPASSING, AND SECURITIZATION 
In late May 2016, we (Karrar and Mostowlansky and our students from Lahore) arrived in 
Gilgit Town (pop. 250,000)—the administrative center of Gilgit-Baltistan—to teach a multi-
sited field course on the history and ecology of the region. In the first session we read from 
Owen Lattimore’s (1962) Inner Asian Frontiers of China, followed by James Scott’s (2009) 
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Southeast Asia in session two. We 
also experienced repeated encounters with Pakistan’s security services. While 
Mostowlansky’s Swiss citizenship had initially piqued their curiosity, our mobile university 
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course—conducted in hotel rooms, terraces, bazaars, and pastures—likewise became 
anomalous and “illegible” (Das & Poole, 2004, p. 8) from the security services’ perspective. 
Later meetings and phone calls with state representatives followed, even though we could not 
be faulted as our documents and activities did not violate regulations. Nevertheless, we were 
followed on our city walks through Gilgit Town, our state encounters easing only slightly 
after we traveled further north to the Hunza Valley, where the larger number of tourists has 
normalized the presence of outsiders. 
 Securitization and continuous attempts to demonstrate the all-pervasive power of the 
state are not new phenomena in Gilgit-Baltistan, having affected foreigners, people from 
Gilgit-Baltistan, and Pakistani citizens from other parts of the country for some time now. 
Grieser (2014) argues that the attribution of spying to foreigners and other “illegible” 
individuals, both historically and in contemporary perspective, is a common practice in the 
region. Such encounters with the state—in our case embodied in security officials in aviator 
sunglasses and shalwar kameez (the baggy trousers and knee-length shirt that are 
characteristic of the region)—are also situated in the longer history of Gilgit-Baltistan and 
Pakistani state formation. In the previous sections, we discussed the region’s marginality 
against the backdrop of colonial legacies and post-colonial state formation; here we want to 
underscore how emotion, feeling, and affect play a crucial role in this history of assembling 
marginality, which leads from rivalry between the British and Russian Empires, via the 
fractures of a divided subcontinent, to the current ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, 
and Xinjiang. We argue that in this history, the state is “an object of emotional investment” 
(Laszkowski & Reeves, 2015, p. 3). Simultaneously, it is also “a site of fear, paranoia, or 
mutual suspicion,” one of “desire for political recognition and political participation,” and 
eventually one of hope for “order” (ibid.). 
 As we have also described, Gilgit-Baltistan’s political positioning within Pakistan is 
deliberately marginal: the region does not have constitutional status, nor do its inhabitants 
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have the same right to political representation as other citizens of Pakistan. Having emerged 
from the unresolved conflict in Kashmir, this status is marked by geopolitical considerations 
of both past and present governments. Besides the exclusion imposed on Gilgit-Baltistan by 
the state, there is also latent anxiety that Gilgit-Baltistan could break away from its protector, 
as evidenced by the presence of at least one mainstream political party—the Balawaristan 
National Front—which has an openly separatist agenda (Sökefeld, 1999).  
In more recent years, and particularly since 2001 following the fall of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan and the onset of the global war on terror, state anxieties have resulted 
in everyday suspicion against outsiders as potential spies and against those people in Gilgit-
Baltistan who welcome them. For instance, local government officials as well as villagers in 
Hunza, Nagar, and the outskirts of Gilgit have told Mostowlansky since 2012 that there was 
the need to be vigilant, as one could never know who marks the targets for US drone strikes. 
Yet, while drone strikes along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan began in 2004 and continue 
to the present (Bashir & Crews, 2012), no such attacks have occurred in Gilgit-Baltistan. This 
anxiety over a loss of sovereignty, expressed in a region where no drone strike has ever taken 
place, indexes Gilgit-Baltistan as an object of emotional investment. In the broader 
framework of Pakistan, this object is both “integral” and kept at bay. It therefore needs to be 
secured horizontally and vertically (Elden, 2013) to prevent uncontrolled intrusions on the 
ground and aerial breaches of sovereignty by those who betray Pakistan’s hospitality.            
 The interplay between Gilgit-Baltistan’s marginal status and its defining role for 
Pakistan as a nation has recently intensified through the emergence of the China–Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Ch. Zhongba jingji zoulang; Ur: Pakistan Chin iqtesadi 
rahdari), discussions about which are now all-pervasive, not only in Gilgit-Baltistan but 
across Pakistan. CPEC is an appendage to China’s One Belt, One Road policy (Ch. yidai 
yilu), President Xi Jinping’s signature initiative for infrastructure connectivity across Afro-
Eurasia (Karrar, 2016; Sidaway & Woon, 2017). CPEC was unveiled during Premier Li 
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Keqiang’s visit to Pakistan in May 2013, and was initially meant to channel approximately 
US$46 billion of Chinese investment in Pakistan in the coming decade; since then, pledges of 
Chinese investment have crossed the US$50 billion mark. While much of this investment is 
earmarked for energy generation, communications and transport infrastructure are also meant 
to get an upgrade in an attempt to enhance connectivity between Khunjerab, located in Gilgit-
Baltistan, and the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar (in Baluchistan province), which is operated by 
the China Overseas Port Holding Company. Gilgit-Baltistan, by virtue of its boundary with 
China, is seen as a gateway region.  
 Both while conducting fieldwork in northern Pakistan in recent years and while 
traveling in the region with our students, we observed that state representatives and common 
citizens alike used the idea of emergent connectivity with China to legitimize a range of 
practices. For instance, in June 2016 police informed us that mobility along the Karakoram 
Highway was being monitored and the border area was under increasing surveillance to 
ensure tighter control and security because of CPEC. Delays and the mandatory registration of 
travelers resulted from this surveillance regime. These checks on mobility were accompanied 
by resignation and comments that investments under CPEC needed to be guarded. Locals 
sometimes reflect state narratives by apologetically mentioning that the military was 
“nervous” due to CPEC.5 At the same time, others sarcastically assessed the twenty-five 
overly luxurious and shiny police pick-ups, labeled “CPEC GB Police Patrol,” which the 
Chinese government had gifted to Gilgit-Baltistan in early 2016 (Mir, 2016). For instance, 
                                                                                                                
5 CPEC has led to attempts to legitimize state control elsewhere in Pakistan. For instance, when Mostowlansky 
planned to stay at an interlocutor’s residence in Islamabad in June 2016, he was denied permission by the 
apartment block manager, who explained that the capital was along the corridor within which official permission 
was required for non-citizens to stay at private residences. Later, in August 2016, Pakistan’s chief of army staff, 
General Raheel Sahrif, declared that a suicide attack on a Quetta hospital was in fact an attack on CPEC by 
“enemies of the country” (Dawn, 2016b).  
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Aman, a teacher in a village in Gojal, told Mostowlansky in June 2016: “It’s good they kept it 
short and used CPEC; this way it can actually be translated as ‘China–Punjab Economic 
Corridor.’” This alteration of the acronym’s meaning reflects the widespread opinion in 
Gilgit-Baltistan that the country’s elite, traditionally situated in the province of Punjab, do not 
work for Pakistan as a whole, but gain benefits from the region and try to fill their own 
pockets.  
 The state’s upbeat narrative that CPEC will result in benefits for all finds little traction 
in Gilgit-Baltistan. Connectivity with China is not resulting in the benefits that were 
promised. As Karrar’s ongoing field research along the Karakoram Highway shows, a new 
border regime was initiated with the introduction of CPEC. Where previously traders who 
could demonstrate that they were domiciled in Gilgit-Baltistan were allowed to self-import 
small quantities of merchandise from Xinjiang duty-free, the new border regime restricts 
cross-border peddling. CPEC aims to streamline management of sea and land ports, thereby 
controlling the exit and entry of merchandise, people, and capital. As a result, local traders, 
who even prior to CPEC were operating on very thin profit margins, have found their profits 
diminishing further. Larger traders—who tend to be from either the Punjab or Khyber-
Paktunkhwa—can sustain the newly imposed tariffs because of the greater volume they trade 
in. There is, moreover, growing concern about the environmental impact of the corridor: What 
will the impact of hundreds of containers suddenly rolling down the Karakoram Highway on a 
daily basis be? How will this affect the rhythm of rural life in close-knit communities? 
Children who walk to school and play along the road? Privacy? 
 These issues are compounded by the region’s ambiguous constitutional status. Since 
January 2016, the government has been under renewed pressure to grant provincial status in 
order to provide constitutional cover to the extensive Chinese investments. As mentioned 
earlier, China is investing in a region that is disputed between India and Pakistan (Dawn, 
2016a). In this context, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement on 15 August 2016 
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that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan had approached him with grievances signals how providing 
provincial status could benefit the state. Writing in a local news blog, Pamir Times, Ali 
(2016), a former judge of the supreme appellate court of Gilgit-Baltistan, stated categorically 
that the “[c]onstitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan must be ascertained in accordance with the 
wishes of Gilgit-Baltistan. The people of Gilgit-Baltistan are demanding the extension of the 
constitution of Pakistan and provincial status since their independence.” Besides calling for 
the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to the region, Ali concluded 
his opinion piece by calling upon the government to underscore, yet again, the benefit that 
CPEC would provide to the region.  
 Situated within a longer history of connectivity, the purported emphasis behind the 
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is not new. Plans to link Kashgar in Xinjiang with the 
port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea date back to the 1950s and had already served as the 
backdrop to the construction of the Karakoram Highway (Ispahani, 1989, p. 159). Both the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods in Gilgit-Baltistan have been marked by the Pakistani 
and Chinese governments’ continuous efforts to connect their urban centers by traversing the 
region. While the area has thus always been central to Pakistani visions of political stability 
and economic success, Gilgit-Baltistan has also persistently been located at the country’s 
spatial and societal margins. In the wake of China’s current One Belt, One Road initiative, the 
idea of connecting major urban centers in a global system of supply chains emphasizes this 
paradox of colonial and Cold War histories in Gilgit-Baltistan, in which the frontier is both 
crucial to the state’s existence, but also a mere place of passing-through and transit. Much of 
the general dissatisfaction with political processes in Gilgit-Baltistan is directly linked to this 
paradoxical situation in which promises of prosperity are continuously uttered in political 
discourse, yet never quite materialize and keep being postponed to a near future.  
We argue that this is part of the process of assembling marginality in Gilgit-Baltistan. 
This ever-evolving assemblage emerges from the interaction of frontier history and a political 
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economy that is both imposed by the outside and locally reinforced. Thus, Gilgit-Baltistan’s 
“border area” status is only one part in this assemblage of marginality, which provides other 
analytical points of connection with marginal spaces beyond the classical borderland. For 
instance, Karachi’s neighborhood of Lyari allows for ample comparison via the rubric of 
marginality. As recent scholarship on Lyari shows, the neighborhood’s history has been 
marked by a continuous process of marginalization that is based on patterns of migration, 
economic diversion, contested state power, and a discourse of danger tied to Balochi gangs 
with links to the Afghan frontier (Gayer, 2014; Kirmani, 2015; Viqar, 2014). This is 
contrasted by the gigantic, yet dysfunctional and exclusionary road development surrounding 
the Lyari Expressway (Hasan, 2005), as well as by new forms of securitization emerging from 
Operation Karachi, an ongoing effort of various security forces, including the Frontier 
Constabulary, to counter gang violence and organized crime. Yet the most striking strand of 
comparison between locales in Gilgit-Baltistan and Lyari is the extent to which marginality 
provides identificatory potential to people who live in such spaces. For instance, Viqar (2014, 
p. 372) argues that in Lyari discourses of subversion and local communal harmony go hand in 
hand with developmental aspirations. In the following section we discuss this paradoxical 
process based on our fieldwork in Gilgit-Baltistan, where desire for and disappointment with 
state institutions are often part and parcel of people’s marginal identities, which play a pivotal 
role in this assemblage of marginality.               
  
TO WAIT OR NOT TO WAIT FOR THE STATE  
As pointed out in the previous sections of this article, literature on contemporary Gilgit-
Baltistan which stays within the national framework of Pakistan often accurately depicts a 
region that has not yet reached full integration into a larger political and economic whole due 
to its liminal constitutional status. From this perspective, Gilgit-Baltistan seems either to 
evade the nation-state or to remain desperately dependent on lines of connectivity to 
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Pakistan’s down-country centers Karachi and Islamabad (Dani, 1989a; Haines, 2012). In 
contrast, Kreutzmann’s (2015) study of Gilgit-Baltistan as part of a broader transnational 
crossroads, including adjacent borderlands in Afghanistan, China, and Tajikistan, suggests 
transcending this national gaze. Instead of taking the nation-state for granted in the sense of 
an a priori scale, his study looks at modes of connection and disconnection between the 
different borderlands dissecting the Pamir-Karakoram. In the context of a broader 
comparative perspective on marginal spaces, we would again like to emphasize that such an 
outlook is not uniquely tied to the proximity of international borders. Rather, the existence of 
international borders in the area highlights such processes, which might be less obvious in 
other locales. For example, in the case of the neighborhood of Lyari in Karachi (discussed in 
the previous section), Kirmani (2015) argues that local violence, and the area’s resulting 
marginality, cannot be understood without considering broader transregional forces that act 
upon Lyari and enmesh its inhabitant in multiple forms of mobility. 
 In historical perspective, Kreutzmann (2015) employs the category of “desire” to refer 
to the ways outside forces—particularly colonial and nation-state powers—have sought to 
make inroads into Gilgit-Baltistan and its surrounding borderlands and to bring the region 
under their control. This approach to how centers far beyond the borderlands have lustfully 
worked upon Gilgit-Baltistan and its neighboring stretches of land is important for an 
understanding of the region’s colonial and post-colonial histories. At the same time, little 
work has been done on the role of desire in how people in Gilgit-Baltistan position 
themselves toward processes of state-making (Laszkowski & Reeves, 2015). Scott’s (2009) 
influential study on the state in the borderlands of highland Southeast Asia—a region which 
he, invoking Van Schendel (2002), dubbed “Zomia”—highlights historical processes of cross-
border scale-jumping and state evasion. Kreutzmann (2015, p. 34) points to the theoretical 
potential that Scott’s alternate scale brings to Pakistan’s north, whose people have employed 
changing patterns of mobility throughout the region to adapt and position themselves toward 
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different emerging political actors. Evading specific polities has been part of these 
movements at different points in time, including the present. Yet based on our ethnography 
presented in this section, we argue that local people’s desire for the state—in the sense of an 
affective political relationship—underlines both the ambivalence of marginality as an identity 
and its salience for the regional political economy.  
 In the context of Gilgit-Baltistan’s lukewarm integration into the larger framework of 
the Pakistani nation, the establishment of state power in the region has been a slow and 
continuous process throughout the second half of the twentieth century. For people who live 
along the Karakoram Highway—and this is the majority of people in Gilgit-Baltistan—the 
emergence of the Pakistani state has also been intricately linked to the construction of 
infrastructure, which has gone hand in hand with growing Chinese influence and the 
establishment of development projects that tie in with local religious and ethnic identities 
(Butz & Cook, 2011; Haines, 2012; Hussain, 2015; Kreutzmann, 1991 and 2015; 
Mostowlansky, 2016; Rippa, 2014). However, increasing mobility along the main road and 
the linking of specific places in Gilgit-Baltistan to urban centers in other parts of Pakistan 
have also led to experiences of disconnection and to an acute sense of the absence of the state 
in other locales. For instance, in Shimshal, an assemblage of three village communities in 
Gojal, upper Hunza, a road linking the villages to the Karakoram Highway was only 
completed in the fall of 2003. While the speed of connectivity to down-country Pakistan had 
accelerated along the highway from the early 1980s onward, people from Shimshal still had to 
walk for several days to reach the road (Hussain, 2015, p. 130). Initially, the road-building 
project was supported by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, which is part of the 
international Aga Khan Development Network and intimately tied to Shia Ismaili Muslims in 
the region. Only at a much later stage did the Pakistani government emerge as a patron of 
road building. In addition, the construction and continuous maintenance of the Shimshal road 
Assembling Marginality 
   25 
has also always been linked to communal contributions and local efforts to facilitate access to 
other parts of the country (Ali & Butz, 2005, p. 3).     
 As Butz and Cook (2011) and Hussain (2015, p. 135) note, the opening of the 
Shimshal road has not simply resulted in positive attitudes toward connectivity to other parts 
of Pakistan. While future-oriented visions of economic and social development play an 
important role, nostalgia for a lost remoteness does, too. During our most recent fieldwork in 
the area in summer 2016, Shimshalis described the road to us as a local achievement that 
provides access to work and education in Gilgit and the cities of down-country Pakistan. Yet 
often the very same people told us that the construction of the road and the discontinuation of 
the footpath to Passu had made Shimshalis weak and complacent. Frequent floods and 
landslides that block the road, at times for weeks on end, are landmark events in Shimshal that 
bundle up local people’s ambivalent attitudes toward place, community, and state. For 
instance, while returning from the high pastures (4700 m.a.s.l.) to the village, Mostowlansky 
spent many hours interviewing Fareed, who grew up in Shimshal and who is now a student in 
a Pakistani city. In summer 2015, Fareed got stuck in the village for two months when the 
road was blocked due to torrential rains. He described the process of fixing the road as 
follows: 
 
First we waited for the state to come. Nothing happened. We always wait. Then we 
started to do repair work on the road ourselves. People around here have to do most 
things themselves. So, you wait for the state; it is nice and quiet and nobody comes. 
And then you need the road too much. By the time officials show up we are done 
already. 
 
Several themes that are important to a discussion of marginal identity and the state in Gilgit-
Baltistan emerge from Fareed’s description of the blocked Shimshal road: the wish for the 
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state to be there and the state’s absence, the nexus between quietness and disconnection, and 
local agency in re-establishing access. While Fareed talked about the temporary advantages of 
forced “state evasion” resulting from the blocked road, his statement also reflects a desire for 
the state to show up in time. The view that Shimshalis can perform construction activities and 
other acts of statecraft themselves—an opinion uttered by many we spoke with—emphasizes 
a sense of local agency and the role of physical place-making. Yet in the final analysis it is the 
state that is supposed to coordinate and perform these acts, at least from a Shimshali 
perspective. Literature on marginality and the state from around the world has emphasized 
both the forms of exclusion and the creative potential that emerge from positions of 
marginalization (see, e.g., Anwar, 2016; Das & Poole, 2004; Green, 2005; Mostowlansky, 
2017 and forthcoming; Tsing, 1993 and 1994; Williams, Vira & Chopra, 2011). As much as 
marginality implies suffering brought on by political disregard and economic neglect, it also 
often forms an identity. In the case of Shimshal—and Gilgit-Baltistan more generally—
criticism of the state does not stand in contradistinction to the desire for the state to be there. 
In fact, Gilgit-Baltistan’s liminal constitutional status has informed local identities, which 
draw heavily on marginality, on difference from the center, and on being the state’s other. 
Pakistan’s efforts to align with China and to increase the capacity for trade and the speed of 
exchange along the Karakoram Highway expose these identities to processes of geopolitical 
scale. Against this backdrop, local desire for the state suggests an important counter-narrative 
to a view of marginal spaces as marked by greedy engagements by outside forces and local 
attempts to evade such efforts. We argue instead that complex interactions between local and 
outside actors in past and present have co-constituted an assemblage of marginality in Gilgit-
Baltistan that continues to evolve in and beyond the region.   
           
CONCLUSION 
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State-led megaprojects, the most notable being the Karakoram Highway, have continuously 
drawn Pakistan’s distant frontier regions more tightly into the state’s administration network. 
Travel times between Gilgit-Baltistan and central Pakistan, as well as within Gilgit-Baltistan 
itself, have declined dramatically. In 2001, when Karrar first visited Shimshal, it took two 
days to walk from the end of the jeep track to the village; now that same route can be 
traversed by car in three hours. Likewise, the growing net of cellular telecommunication has 
allowed the region to shed its label of remoteness. By December 2016, cellular 
communication had reached Shimshal, whereas earlier, even in towns and villages directly 
along the Karakoram Highway, communication linkages with down-country Pakistan were 
patchy. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the Karakoram Highway was in a state of perpetual 
disrepair, flights to the region were delayed for weeks on end, the latest newspaper was many 
days old, and when telephone lines were down—which was often—it was understood that 
they would be down indefinitely. Rapid development in Gilgit-Baltistan has made all of this 
history in an extremely short period of time. Projected infrastructure upgrades under CPEC—
which envisions the Karakoram Highway as a major transport corridor linking western China 
to the Arabian Sea—will bring the region closer to Pakistan’s centralizing state machinery. 
Yet herein lies the paradox: although Gilgit-Baltistan is being brought into the state ambit at 
rapid rate—through the influx of state officials and flows of transnational capital as well as 
infrastructural development—marginality in the region has not declined. 
 In this article, we have argued that marginality—which is captured in Gilgit-
Baltistan’s “border area” status—has been assembled throughout the twentieth century up 
until today. We identified four “parts” that inform this process: (1) A residual colonial legacy 
that stems from the nature of colonial rule along the Himalayan frontier. After 1947, 
exclusion was imposed on Gilgit-Baltistan, as the region became an appendage to post-
colonial Pakistan’s positioning vis-à-vis its territorial dispute with India. (2) The 
appropriation of Gilgit-Baltistan into a national imagination about the nation-state. In part, 
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this is a continuation of a colonial gaze that saw the frontier—and its inhabitants—as 
different. Simultaneously, there was a need for a frontier in the post-colonial imagination. 
This frontier remains a space that is created—through the writing of history and in cultural 
tropes—and perpetrated in society, making the frontier essential to the imagination of a 
national polity. (3) The exigency of security. The wave of securitization that blanketed the 
country in the wake of 9/11 has gotten its second wind in the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor. In Gilgit-Baltistan, securitization—in the form of state practices and resulting 
changes in people’s perceptions—has amplified the marginality of the region. (4) Marginality 
as identity. Marginality does not only refer to a lack of resources or distance from state 
services. Rather, in continuous interaction with the other three parts, it also opens up 
possibilities for people to position themselves vis-à-vis the state.  
This article was inspired by the authors’ long-term fieldwork in northern Pakistan and  
a rich joint pedagogical exercise in the region. We want to conclude, however, by underlining 
that our view of marginality as an assemblage—such as the one we have described here—
extends far beyond the region at the territorial limits of Pakistan. In this regard we have 
mentioned the neighborhood of Lyari in Karachi, but also suggest considering other “no-go 
areas” in megacities of the South. At the same time we see ample analytical potential in 
looking at less obvious cases, for instance gender dynamics in Karachi’s multi-ethnic high-
rise buildings, which Ring (2008) aptly analyzes through the rubric of the “vertical village.” 
Parallels can also be found in indigenous struggles over natural resources—land, water, and 
forests—from South Asia to South America, where local narratives of belonging and rights 
clash with the purported interests of a national polity and capital. Although an in-depth 
discussion of such comparisons lies outside the scope of this article, they hint at the sort of 
analytical linkages that are possible once we disengage the border area from its traditional 
location. In these cases, it is helpful to consider how other assemblages of marginality are 
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marked by divisions of class and capital, race and gender, mobility and immobility, allowing 
for a wider applicability, we believe, of these lessons from northern Pakistan. 
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